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ABSTRACT : The three basic elements where we traditionally com-
mence strategic planning have changed dramatically in the past
two years. A new national security strategy recasts the roles
and missions of the armed forces in new terms. The submarine
force needs to be justified under the new grammar for warfare as
a part of the four new mission areas under the new national
military strategy. The submarine force alone can perform the
strategic deterrence and defense missions. The submarine's role
in presence involves a high/low mix choice. There should be
increased emphasis on the submarine force for crisis response:
(1) rapid response, (2) shore bombardment and strike, (3) as the
initial leading maritime component for second major regional
contingencies, and (4) initial and limited sea control. A Euro-
pean regional war evolving out of a major regional contingency is
not the same thing as the old European-centered global war with
the USSR. Decreased emphasis should be placed on strategic anti-
submarine warfare. Reconstitution goals could be met with at-sea
nuclear weapons.
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The Submarine 1 s Role in Future Naval Warfare
James John Tritten
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943
1.0 Introduction
President George Bush's speech at the Aspen Institute in
August 1990 ushered in a new era for national security and na-
tional military planning that has profound repercussions on navy
and submarine program planning for the future. The days of the
submarine force being important as the center of an aggressive,
offensive, high-seas, warfighting maritime strategy are over.
Instead, roles for the armed forces of the United States are
being recast into a more benign international security environ-
ment that will change service and combat arms roles and missions
as well as influence our worldwide command and control structure.
Today's panel, and my own paper, will talk about how the new
international security and equally new fiscal environments will
affect the submarine's role in future naval warfare. These new
environments will result in both diminished roles as well as new
opportunities to exercise submarines to their full potential.
There are a few general approaches to arguments which justi-
fy maintaining a submarine force. One approach is to concentrate
on the deployed and emerging technologies and argue for the most
capable submarine that can be built. Another approach is to
concentrate on stated requirements. In the past decade, or so,




and mission requirements. This is no longer the case. This
paper, like the new regionally-focused defense strategy, will
take a decidedly top-down approach.
2 . Strategic Planning
Generic strategic planning starts with one of three possible
inputs: (1) the threat, (2) goals, or (3) resources available.
Where to start planning depends upon the type of planning being
conducted; program planning versus operational planning, declara-
tory UNCLASSIFIED planning versus classified actual planning.
What has occurred since even before the President's Aspen speech
is a revolution in the threat assumptions facing program and
operational planners, a realization that defense resources would
shift significantly, and a conclusion that goals therefore should
and will change. Planners today are faced with the unenviable
task of attempting to adjust to near-simultaneous changes in all
three elements that drive strategy. This strategic planning
construct drives the roles and missions of the future fleet.
Our new regional defense strategy is very much top->down and
driven by budgets and the breakup of the Soviet empire. The 1990
budget summit's 25% reduction over five years was due to Congress
watching the old threat crumble and the perceived need to reallo-
cate resources from defense to other sectors of the budget. The
President's new strategic concept was developed in response to
the budget agreement rather than as a result of a long-term




in-Chief (CinCs) and services that focused on goals, objectives,
or available technologies.
Since Aspen, the CinCs and services have participated more
fully in the strategic planning process that will implement the
President's visions. The major constraint, however, is that
defense resources were not adjusted. The Base Force, therefore,
was designed to support the new national security strategy which
was developed to fit within the agreed 25% budget reduction. The
new regionally-focused defense strategy does not ask the armed
forces to perform missions which the Base Force cannot handle.
Scenarios associated with the new regional defense strategy call
for programmed responses that can be met by forces that do not
exceed the Base Force. The submarine force's future programming
roles and missions, therefore, derive from budget assumptions
rather than serve as an input to them.
Submarine program planning, therefore, revolves around an
appreciation for a changed threat perception, a new regionally-
focused defense strategy, and the resource limits of the Base
Force. This paper will now discuss each of these in turn.
3 . Military Threats
Rather than recite the numbers and quality of the myriad of
potential military threats facing the United States over the next
ten years, this paper will instead take a more macro-level ap-




program planning for years has simply gone away. The old thea-
ter-strategic offensive operation with Soviet tank armies on the
move from the inter-German border to the Pyrenees, and the asso-
ciated actions on the high seas, is a threat that our programmed
active (AC) and reserve component (RC) forces no longer have to
deal with. Similarly, a world with two nuclear superpowers and
tens of thousands of warheads pointed at each other is likewise a
world that does not need to be planned for with programmed
forces
.
On the other hand, there obviously are existing Russian and
other former Soviet republics' nuclear and conventional capabili-
ties still facing the United States and its allies and which far
exceed those necessary for self-defense. Existing allied and
American forces meet that challenge and interim plans will govern
their use during the transition period from the confrontational
world of the 1980s to the programmed world of 1995 and beyond.
This paper, and indeed this symposium, is largely focused on the
programming world of 1995 and beyond, not the residual threats
facing current forces today.
3 . 1 Resurgent /Emergent Global Threat
Leaks of the administration's planning scenarios in the
February 17, 1992 New York Times indicate that the Pentagon may
be using the phrase "resurgent/emergent global threat" (REGT) to
describe a generic (non-Russian/Soviet) threat which requires a




tary force structure of the 1980s. These press accounts origi-
nated from a leak of a yet unapproved draft of the annual classi-
fied Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and associated planning
scenarios. Additional press reporting of this REGT threat is
found in the February 20, 1992 Washington Post. 4 According to
this report, a REGT is described as:
"...an 'authoritarian and strongly anti-
democratic' government [developing] over
about three years, beginning in 1994. After
four or five years of military expansion, the
REGT is ready to begin 'a second Cold War' by
the year 2001, or launch a major global war
that could last for years."
Within the new strategy construct, programmed forces for a
global war, and perhaps even a major regional war, are put into
the category of reconstitution; i.e. wholly new forces that are
developed once strategic warning is recognized and appropriate
decisions are made. The assumed warning time for a global war
shifted first from the traditional few weeks to, according to the
President's concepts at Aspen, a few years. According to the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VJCS) , "...we can now
expect eight-to-ten years' warning [emphasis added] time, in
which to reconstitute larger forces."
The point to all this is that for programming purposes, the
strategy does not require the military to develop active or even
reserve forces to meet the challenge of the old European-centered
global war. The new missions for the AC and RC programmed force





3 .2 Regional Threats
Threats less than that of a global war, generally assumed in
the past to be handled by forces procured to globally fight the
former Soviet Union, now occupy the mainstream of programming
warfighting contingencies. A series of conventional conflict
scenarios used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were contained in the





from generic counterinsurgency (COIN) and counter-narcotics (CN)
,
to lesser regional contingencies (LRC) , to major regional contin-
gencies (MRC) . A major regional contingency might, if not prop-
erly handled, escalate into a regional war. Regional war is not
viewed as a smaller version of the old global war.
The mid-February 1992 DPG leaks in The New York Times and
the Washington Post also contained the specific locations of the
programming regional threat scenarios under our new national
military strategy. Although these scenarios were neither ap-
proved nor predictive, they nevertheless provide a glimpse as to
what the administration is considering to discuss with the Con-
gress. They are, therefore, useful in developing other scenarios
which will lead to roles and missions for the fleet and the
submarine force and have been used by this panel for the purpose
of discussion.
The leaked scenario for a regional war escalating from a
major European crisis involved Russia invading portions of Lith-




military demanding DPG scenario, according to press reports. The
threat only involved some 24 divisions and a ground advance on
one theater axis. The numbers of divisions associated with the
n
old European-centered global war with the USSR were much higher.
The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United
States speaks of a "potential threat to a single flank or region"
and a "limited, conventional threat to Europe." The point is
that current discussions of wars or crises in Europe do not begin
to approach the magnitude of v/hat NATO thought it faced a few
years ago. They also do not contain any discussion of responses
that shift the conflict to a new theater or sub-theater as geo-
graphic escalation, or escalation over time.
The leaked MRC in Korea was an attack from the North on the
South. The MRC in Southwest Asia (SWA) involved Iraq invading
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The Joint Chiefs apparently also were
interested in exploring simultaneous major regional contingen-
cies. While the U.S. is occupied in SWA, North Korea invades the
South. All of these MRCs, including the European contingency and
war, present threats at the operational-level of warfare—below
Q
the strategic-level of warfare.
In the category of LRCs, the news reports listed a coup in
Panama (roughly 2,000 n.m. from the U.S.) and one in the Philip-
pines (roughly 6,000 n.m. from the U.S.). LRCs required the




These threat scenarios are at the tactical-level of warfare, not
the operational-level of warfare.
3. 3 Threat Schematic
A complete schematic of programming military threats based
upon administration sources and the leaked scenarios is contained
in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
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The Navy and the submarine force must be able to explain how
its traditional operations and missions support scenarios such as
these in the programming world of today. The inability of the
submarine force to do this will make it more difficult to obtain
the support of the Chairman of the JCS or the Secretary of De-
fense when they testify to the Congress.
4 . Planning Goals and Objectives
The new regionally-focused defense strategy has four ele-
ments: (1) strategic deterrence and defense, (2) forward
presence, (3) crisis response, and (4) reconstitution . Although
the first three of these appear to be terms with which we are
well familiar, a careful reading of the administration's words on
these subjects reveals significant differences that will impact
on fleet and submarine programming.
4 . 1 Strategic Deterrence and Defense
The cornerstone of American defense strategy will remain
deterrence of aggression and coercion against the U.S., its
allies, and friends. Deterrence is achieved by convincing a
potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level,
exceeds any possibility of gain. Should deterrence fail, the
strategy calls on the U.S. armed forces to defend the nation's
vital interests against any potential foe.
To achieve this goal, the U.S. will continue its moderniza-




mand, control, and communications capabilities. The U.S. is also
committed to improving its strategic nuclear defensive capabili-
ties. The U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy will remain committed
to fostering nuclear stability, an environment in which no nation
perceives a compelling advantage in using nuclear weapons in a
first-strike.
The Washington Post broke a story, in early January 1992,
that reported on the depth of thinking about new changes to
American nuclear war plans. According to the press report, it
was suggested by a Blue-ribbon panel that the U.S. should prepare
contingency targeting packages against "every reasonable adver-
sary" in the world and substitute five separate targeting plans
for the current Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) . New
limited nuclear options (LNOs) of 1-10 warheads should be de-
veloped and the U.S. "...should rethink its 1979 pledge not to
use nuclear arms against Third World countries..."
The press report further stated that the U.S. should develop
a Nuclear Expeditionary Force and that it should retain a nuclear
strategic reserve which could be used against industrial targets
in the former USSR or against other nations if the U.S. and
Russia were to ever engage in nuclear warfighting.
About a month after this story appeared in the press, Secre-
tary of Defense Dick Cheney testified to the Senate Armed Serv-




longer need to hold at risk what future Russian leaders hold
dear." Cheney went on to say that:
"This would require unambiguous evidence of a
fundamental reorientation of the Russian
government: institutionalization of democra-
cy, positive ties to the West, compliance
with existing arms reduction agreements,
possession of a nuclear force that is non-
threatening to the West (with low numbers of
weapons, non-MIRVed [multi-independently
targetable reentry vehicles], and not on high
alert status) , and possession of conventional
capabilities nonthreatening to neighbors."
One new area for strategic nuclear warfare will be to re-
spond flexibly to lower levels of aggression. Strategic defenses
can be effective in countering the growing threat of ballistic
missiles from nations other than the former USSR. Indeed, Secre-
tary Cheney used the term "extended protection" instead of
"extended deterrence" in his 1992 Congressional testimony when he
referred to the role of deterrent forces providing coverage for
American friends and allies.
4 . 2 Forward Presence
According to Secretary Cheney's February 1991 Congressional
testimony, the U.S. will also devise a dynamic "peacetime engage-
ment" strategy to deter low intensity conflict and support inter-
national stability. The August 1991 National Security Strategy
of the United States says that the U.S. "...cannot be the world's
policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's securi-
ty problems." Indeed, America's presence and crisis response
role under the new national security strategy should not be akin




forces will participate in that strategy largely in the form of
overseas presence.
In his Aspen speech, the President alluded to maintaining a
forward presence by exercises. Chairman of the JCS General Colin
L. Powell, U.S. Army, stated in December 1990 that forward
presence includes military assistance programs. In his February
1991 testimony to Congress, General Powell expanded his defini-
tion of presence to include, but not be limited to: stationed
forces, rotational deployments, access and storage agreements,
combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port
visits, and military-to-military relations.
The 1991 JMNA adds combined planning, nation-assistance,
peacekeeping efforts, logistic arrangements, supporting lift, and
exchanges to the list of forms of military presence. The August
1991 National Security Strategy of the United States includes
training missions and prepositioned equipment. The National
Military Strategy included countering terrorism, protecting
American citizens, and the war on drugs. Other pronouncements
include forces afloat and intelligence sharing and cooperation.
These expanded definitions should be viewed as attempts by
the administration to ensure that all planned future activities
will satisfy the requirement to maintain an overseas presence
with a smaller force, the Base Force. Simply put under the new





Generally, the submarine force has been excluded from Ameri-
can discussions on presence and naval diplomacy. Foreign govern-
ment, however, have not always turned a blind eye to our includ-
ing submarines in foreign exercises or in port visits. Dr. Jan
Breemer s paper suggests that this should not be the case in the
future. 13 This argument will not be accepted easily by other
parts of the Navy or even other services or the Departments of
Defense or State. Presence as a mission for the submarine force
will not be a force builder and will not drive the problem unless
it is tied to an effective concurrent role in crisis response.
4 . 3 Crisis Response
There is a risk that the end of the Cold War may bring an
increased risk of regional conflicts and greater unpredictability
in the international security environment. Today's crises are
extremely dangerous due to the proliferation of advanced weaponry
and weapons of mass destruction and the demonstrated willingness
of Third World nations to use them. High technology weapons in
the hands of Third World nations include: ballistic missiles, air
defenses, tactical air forces, cruise missiles, and modern diesel
attack submarines.
U.S. crisis response forces will provide presence and the
ability to reinforce with adequate forces to prevent a potential-
ly major crisis from escalating or to resolve favorably less




focuses on the use of decisive force to limit vertical and hori-
zontal escalation as well as escalation over time; i.e. swift
termination and containing the conflict to the theater of origin.
Obviously, actions outside the affected theater will be consid-
ered if they are necessary to ensure success for a military
operation, but these actions will be considered the exception
rather than the rule.
The JCS recognize that not all crises will evolve in the
same manner. The 1991 JMNA outlines four possible types of
crises: (1) a slow-building crisis; (2) a fast-rising crisis; (3)
imminent conflict; and (4) conflict. The length and intensity of
combat, for planning purposes, is assumed to be 450 days for
COIN/CN, 90 days of low-mid intensity for LRC, 120 days of mid-
high intensity for MRCs, and more than 50 days of mid-high inten-
sity for a war escalating from a European crisis.
Responses to these contingencies are contained in a series
of measured response options. Responses could include a flexible
minimal force deterrent response, a major deterrent response
(Operation DESERT SHIELD) , and more "worst-case" responses where
combat begins soon after or simultaneously with the insertion of
troops. This program of contingency types and measured responses
appears to be a building-block and force sequencing approach to
crisis management.
Naval crisis response goals have been described as using its




seven days. 1 Forward-deployed and surge forces are expected to
combine into "Expeditionary Strike Fleets" within thirty days.
If the crisis is not contained by these efforts, the combined
air, land, and sea forces would be organized within sixty days.
The submarine force must explain how its traditional opera-
tions and missions support contingency operations such as these
in the programming world of today. The inability of the subma-
rine force to do this will make it more difficult to obtain the
support of the Chairman of the JCS or the Secretary of Defense
when they testify to the Congress.
4 . 4 Reconstitution
A fundamental component of the President's new national
security strategy is that, assuming a significant warning of a
Europe-centered global war, the U.S. can generate wholly new
forces—rebuild or "reconstitute" them if necessary--in order to
deter aggression. It includes mobilizing manpower; forming,
training, and fielding combat units; reactivating the defense
industrial base; and building completely new forces. Reconstitu-
tion is considered as the ability to provide a deterrent against
a REGT, not necessarily a 1980s global warfighting capability.
Reconstitution is not the same thing as mobilization or
regeneration—it is more like what the United Kingdom had planned
during the interwar years, when it assumed, as we now appear to
do, that up to ten years of strategic warning would be available.




will be built essentially from the ground up. Preserving this
capability means protecting our infrastructure and the defense
industrial base, preserving our lead in critical technologies,
and stockpiling critical materials. This will be an extremely
challenging task under the current fiscal climate.
4 . 5 Changes in Military Art
Another element in the new national security strategy is an
emphasis on technological breakthroughs that will change military
art. Secretary Cheney first addressed this in his February 1991
remarks to the SASC. Changes in military art occurred during the
inter-war years with the development of blitzkrieg
,
carrier-based
strike naval air, and amphibious warfare capabilities. The
Soviet military has long discussed the "Revolution in Military
Affairs" that occurred after World War II and the advent of
nuclear weapons and long-range means of delivery. Senior Soviet
military officers have been warning of another "revolution" in
the near future. After the splendid performance of U.S. weapons
during Operation DESERT STORM, it appears that their worst fears
were justified. The coming revolution will present enormous
challenges and opportunities in doctrinal and strategy develop-




5. The Base Force
The Base Force, or the new force structure advocated by the
General Powell, will be organized into four basic military compo-
nents: Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive; Atlantic;
Pacific; and a Contingency Force; and four supporting capabili-
ties: Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research and
Development (R&D) . What constitutes those forces is already
being debated and will continue to be debated throughout the next
year.
5 . 1 The Strategic Force
The Strategic Force will initially include those offensive
forces that result from the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START) Treaty, assuming that it finally enters force on all
sides. Previously, goals for the next round of talks had been
identified as low as 3,000 warheads. After unilateral actions
taken by President George Bush in September 1991 and following
his 1992 State of the Union Address, 3,000 warheads may be on the
high side of where we are heading.
In his September 27, 1991 television address to the nation,
Bush announced that he had ordered the immediate stand-down of
alert bombers and 450 MINUTEMAN II ICBMs previously scheduled for
a phased deactivation under START, as well as a number of reduc-
tions in tactical, including naval, nuclear weapons. These
actions placed immediate greater reliance upon the sea-based leg




President Bush announced the cancellation of some land-based and
air-breathing programs and the end of the production of a new
warhead for sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) , the w-88
warhead for the TRIDENT II.
Bush also offered additional reductions if the former Soviet
Union agreed to eliminate all intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) with MIRVs. Specifically, Bush stated that the U.S.
would: (1) do away with all its PEACEKEEPER (MX) missiles, (2)
de-MIRV its existing MINUTEMAN ICBM force, (3) reduce its SLBM
warheads by 1/3, and (4) convert most strategic bombers to a
conventional role.
According to the START Treaty, and under President Bush's
1992 State of the Union proposal, the U.S. will deploy ten OHIO-
class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with
the TRIDENT II (D-5) missile and the first eight OHIO class with
the older TRIDENT I (C-4) SLBM. All of these actions are con-
sistent with a direction in favor of relying primarily on SSBNs
with a survivable, non-prompt, countervalue targeting strategy.
Reducing the offensive threat dramatically to lower numbers
suggests revisiting the suitability of strategic defenses. In
his February 1991 testimony to Congress and subsequent written
report to Congress, Secretary Cheney outlined a reorientation of
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to a system of Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) providing protection




forces overseas, and friends and allies— indicating that it would
be space, ground, and sea-based. There is no reason that the
submarine force cannot be a major contributor to the sea-based
component of GPALS
.
5 . 2 The Atlantic Force
The Atlantic Force will include residual forces in Europe,
those forward-deployed to Europe and Southwest Asia (SWA) , and
the continental U.S. -based reinforcing force (including heavy
ground forces). This force would be responsible for Europe, the
Middle East, and SWA.
To set the Atlantic Force into the context of the missions
outlined in the new regional defense strategy, we find the fol-
lowing military forces recommended by the administration in early
1992:
Presence -- One corps with two divisions,
slightly more than three Air Force fighter
wing equivalents (FWEs) , one carrier battle
group (CVBG) , a Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU) , and prepositioned material in Europe;
one carrier battle group (CVBG) , a MEU, some
air defense batteries, and prepositioned
material in SWA. Presumably the Navy's
current Middle East Force is also included.
Crisis Response -- three AC roundup divi-
sions, 6 RC divisions, 2 AC FWEs, 6 RC FWEs,
4 CVBGs, and 1 Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF)
.
Reconstitution -- 2 RC cadre divisions, 1
training carrier, 32 frigates, and probably




The Atlantic Force would be responsible for the most demand-
ing DPG scenario—that of an European crisis escalating into a
regionalwar. According to the Washington Post report, in this
scenario, the U.S. would spearhead a NATO counterattack with a
minimal force of 7 1/3 heavy Army divisions, a MEF, 49 Air Force
squadrons, and 6 CVBGs. After 89 days of combat, including 21
days of very high intensity counterattack, NATO was expected to
win.
The Europe crisis was characterized as involving an out-of-
area response by NATO to Poland and Lithuania essentially in-
volved a force equal to the entire AC and RC Atlantic Force. If
the U.S. were to take a force equal to the size of entire Atlan-
tic Force and devote it to a single contingency operation, would
we swing forces from other areas? We cannot mass even close to a
full MEF worth of amphibious ships unless we swing forces. Would
swung forces arrive in time? Submarines with a high speed of
advance (SOA) and no open-ocean opposition are a credible swing
force, as the Canadian Navy once explained to its government as a
rationale for nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)
.
Six aircraft carriers were supposedly dedicated to this
Polish-Lithuanian contingency operation. Are these carriers to
be used in the Baltic? If the carriers are to not operate in the
Baltic, will they operate under the principles of the old Mari-
time Strategy and engage Russia in another theater or sub-thea-
ter? Does the submarine force operate under the old Maritime




actions in conformance with the administration's current guide-
lines to limit crises to the theater of origin?
With the publication of the Secretary of Defense's 1992
Annual Report to the President and the Congress , we find that
Atlantic Force transportation goals have been significantly
revised downward from even 1991. The new lift goals for a con-
tingency response in Europe are now only two divisions (instead
of four), two MEBs (instead of one), and associated tactical
fighter sguadrons in about 15 days (instead of 10). Preposition-
ing goals for Europe were likewise reduced from six Army divi-
sions and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) slated for
deployment, with prepositioned equipment, in Norway to only two
Army divisions and the MEB.
Atlantic Force responses need to also be understood in the
context of NATO's new Strategic Concept. In summary format,
Figure 2 explains where it appears that NATO is heading for their









A. Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) , multinational brigade-
sized patterned on Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile
Brigade with about 5,000 personnel available within 72
hrs
B. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)
1. ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) , multinational corps
(4-5 divisions) available within 6-10 days
2. Naval Reaction Forces , to be determined
3. Air Reaction Forces , to be determined
II. Main Defense Forces
A. Active Covering Force
1. Ready Maneuver Forces , 7 Central European national
& multinational corps
B. Reserves , 3 months to activate
III. Augmentation Forces 20+ divisions from North America
Source: The author
The initial guidelines for a response by Rapid Reaction
Forces were within 5-7 days. Those have now been extended to 6-
10 days, calling into serious guestion whether the U.S. needs to
keep an AC ground forces combat capability in-theater. The U.S.
Army and Air Force should be able to return four, instead of two,
divisions to Europe within 10 days if lift and prepositioning
receive sufficient priority.
Additional Rapid Reaction Forces will probably be created
for maritime and air units. For example, there is no reason that




Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) multinational Standing Naval Forces
Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) or the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) —both
elements of NATO's reaction forces. If not a part of these
standing forces, plans should include submarines being integrated
into NATO reaction task groups, task forces, or expanded task
forces
.
The Atlantic Force would also be responsible for an MRC in
SWA. The U.S. is to participate in a coalition response and send
4 2/3 Army divisions, a MEF, 19 Air Force squadrons, and 3 CVBGs
.
Coalition forces are projected to win after 54 days of combat in-
cluding 7 days of very high intensity counterattack. The major
regional contingency in SWA seems to be less ambitious than that
in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
5 . 3 The Pacific Force
To set the Pacific Force into the context of the missions
outlined in the new national security strategy, we find the
following military forces recommended by the administration in
early 1992:
Presence — Slightly less than one division
and one FWE in Korea; slightly more than one
FWE and one home-based CVBG in Japan; a MEF
headquarters and a MEB on Japanese territory;
and a forward-deployed at-sea MEU.
Crisis Response -- one AC light division, 1
reduced capability RC division, 1 AC FWE, 5
CVBGs, and 1 MEB.





The Pacific Force will be responsible for the MRC in Korea.
The U.S. response included 5 Army divisions, 2 MEFs, 20 Air Force
squadrons, and 5 CVBGs. U.S. and Korean forces are expected to
win after 91 days of combat, including 28 days of very high
intensity counterattack.
The Korean contingency involved more Army and Air Force
forces than are contained in the Pacific Force, clearly indicat-
ing that forces can and must be swung between theaters. Since
U.S. transportation goals for Army divisions in non-European
contingencies are lengthy, it implies that this scenario makes
certain assumptions that might be troublesome to some; i.e.
either the American promise to return with significant fighting
power is not backed up with the prompt lift required or foreign
charter is definitely counted on.
5 . 4 Simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies
Two simultaneous scenarios were apparently included in the
draft DPG, according to the press leaks in February 1992. Multi-
ple regional crises are included in the National Military Strate-
gy and discussed in the testimony of numerous officials. 5
Multiple crises do not, however, have to have the same level of
response, even if they are simultaneous. The DPG scenarios,





According to the planning scenario, while the U.S. is occu-
pied in SWA, North Korea invades the South. The Washington Post
reported that under these conditions, it took 70 days of combat
to prevail in SWA and 157 days in Korea. The forces assigned to
the simultaneous MRCs in Korea and SWA were not specified in the
DPG leaks. The force structure may, or may not, be more demand-
ing than the European crisis that leads to a war.
From the leaked DPG discussion of the simultaneous crises
involving SWA and Korea, it appears that the U.S. can plan to
primarily respond in one area and respond with a smaller holding
force in another area. Such an assumption would allow the dual-
use of lift and certain combat assets first for the one crisis
and then later for the second. Dual contingency responses con-
ceptually offers the submarine force an opportunity to provide
rapid reaction and a presence at the second MRC in the absence of
more traditional surface and naval aviation forces.
Although the military will probably be criticized for devis-
ing a two-crisis scenario, this is exactly what the armed forces
faced and handled during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM. The second crisis was not another MRC, however. The
second crises were the evacuation of American nationals from
Liberia (Operation SHARP EDGE June 1990 - January 1991) and






Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the Chairman's
recommended force structure is the idea of a Contingency Force
based in the continental U.S. (CONUS) . For the present, existing
CinCs will still retain their own forward-stationed and deployed
forces for immediate contingency response. CONUS-based contingen-
cy forces will be available, as a quick-response force, to assist
CinCs as well as to provide significant conventional capabilities
for those areas of the world not covered by the Atlantic or
Pacific Forces; i.e. South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, island
nations, and possibly South Asia.
According to General Powell's Congressional testimony in
September 1991, the Army will commit 5 divisions and Air Force 7
wings to the Contingency Force. A MEF, most of the rapid response
sealift and intertheater airlift will also be available to the
Contingency Force. The Navy will apparently provide dual-commit-
ted forces from the Atlantic and Pacific Forces. Special opera-
tions forces (SOF) appear to have a role both with the Contingen-
cy Force and the CinCs. The 1991 JMNA additionally included the
following in their definition of the Contingency Force: Army
airborne, air assault, light, and highly mobile heavy divisions,
Air Force long-range conventional bombers, and Navy attack subma-
rines.
In the category of LRCs, the DPG scenarios apparently in-




Both cases involved significantly smaller levels of forces—no
more than an Army division, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)
,
SOF, a squadron of Air Force aircraft, and 1-2 CVBGs--and without
the active collaboration of allies or host nation support. The
crises are expected to be resolved after 7-8 days of mid- or low-
mid intensity conflict. The LRCs appear to be handled by pri-
marily AC forces available to the CinCs on a day-to-day basis.
It appears that the forward-deployed Atlantic and Pacific
forces will perform tactical-level crisis response while the
reinforcing units assigned to these forces and the Contingency
Force are primarily dedicated to the operational-level of war-
fare. Most of these forward deployed crisis response forces will
probably remain maritime forces and there is no reason to ignore
the capabilities that the submarine force can bring to bear. The
sea services should, however, be prepared to participate in joint
crisis response operations with light Army divisions, Air Force
composite wings, and SOF.
The strength of the sea service's response is that they can
be the first force on the scene with a sustainable capability.
We should expect to see plans for a sequencing of forces with
Army and Air Force units perhaps responding first and Navy and
air-delivered Marine Corps units both enabling or enhancing those
forces. We should also expect to see plans for forward-deployed
MEU-sized Marine Corps and limited Navy units arriving first with





With their advantage of speed and endurance, forward-de-
ployed submarine forces might well be the first maritime forces
on the scene. John Benedict further develops the use of subma-
1 7
rine forces in crisis response in his paper.
5. 6 Net Assessment of Ability to Meet Goals
After assessing the military threats and the recommended
defense program, the 1991 JMNA concludes that "...the Defense
Program provides minimum capability to accomplish national secu-
rity objectives." The 1992 JMNA had not yet been published at
the time of writing this paper, but Chairman Powell referred to
its conclusions in his March 20, 1992 testimony to the SASC.
Powell reported that the JMNA will again conclude that the pro-
grammed force "...will be capable of dealing with the challenges
of an uncertain world." Specifically, the minimum capability
forces recommended by the administration can "accomplish national
security objectives with low to moderate risk."
The Chairman states that there are challenges to our world
leadership in most areas of technology development; i.e. process
technologies and new product development, that might have an
impact on our ability to reconstitute. General Powell sees our
planned offensive strategic deterrence forces continuing to





Regarding crisis response, the JCS will apparently conclude
that programmed forces will be adequate provided that specific
deficiencies in mobility are eliminated. Finally, regarding
presence to support peacetime engagement, the JCS will apparently
conclude that further reductions, other than those recommended by
the administration, in forward basing and access rights give
cause for concern. The Base Force is that minimum defense pro-
gramming force structure necessary to meet America's enduring
needs. It is to revisions to this programmed force that we will
now turn.
5 . 7 Base Force Revisions
The concept of the Base Force precedes that of the DPG
associated scenarios. It should be no surprise, therefore, that
the sizes of the military responses associated with each of the
scenarios do not exceed that contained in the overall Base Force.
If the Base Force is dependent upon a strategy that is largely
budget driven, then the existing scenarios are subject to consid-
erable fluctuation if the 25% budget agreement fails to hold.
Despite the best efforts of the administration to hold the
line at the Base Force, there have already been public discus-
sions of possible revisions to the composition of the Base Force.
The administration has already said that the number of attack
submarines will not remain at 80. An on-going JCS submarine




Navy flag officers have recently hinted at numbers like 50-65,
while recent Congressional debate seems to center between 20-50.
A failure of the 25% budget to hold and an additional sig-
nificant cut in the defense budget should result in asymmetrical
reductions, in favor of the sea services, rather than an equal
portion for each service. After all, the Navy can provide the
bulk, if not all, of our nuclear deterrent forces as well as the
bulk of the combat forces to be assigned presence and crisis
response missions. Given the track record of absorbing such cuts,
the prospect of asymmetrical cutbacks actually happening is
uncertain and we should assume that the other services will be
assigned a major role in crisis response even if their forward
deployed combat presence is significantly reduced.
Instead of actually cutting existing AC or RC, the Pentagon
might cut the promise to build reconstituted forces for the REGT
since warning time has apparently now been extended to 8-10
years. Even if this were the preferred path to handle a reduced
Base Force, it is unlikely that reconstitution program funds
alone can yield the resources necessary to absorb another major
defense cut. Reductions in reconstitution programs might hurt
the submarine force if arguments for the industrial base, SEA-
WOLF, and CENTURION are too closely tied to them.
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S.
Navy, told Congress, in February 1991, that a Base Force, 451-




could provide an immediate response to a crisis anywhere in the
world within 7 days. This response would comprise 1 Amphibious
Strike Task Force, consisting of 1 CVBG and 1 Amphibious Ready
Group (ARG) with an embarked MEU. A second CVBG could be avail-
able within 15 days. A full MEB could arrive within 30 days.
If this was the best that the Navy could do with the first ver-
sion of the Base Force, what will we be able to offer if there
are additional cuts? Are there opportunities for the submarine
force to substitute for the CVBG?
In this election year, it appears that the administration is
attempting to hold the line at the 25% budget cut by daring
Congress to take the actions that might put more ex-servicemen
and defense contractors on the street and in the unemployment
lines. One might conclude that no matter who wins the elections
in November 1992, the military will be cut again. Either Congress
will take the initiative in order to fund domestic programs which
it views with a higher priority, or the re-elected or a new
administration will recommend cuts again. The Base Force, which
was originally viewed as the ceiling for the new force structure,
has become a temporary floor. At best, it will survive until the
elections of 1992.
The challenge for industry is not to make submarines more
capable and quieter but rather to find ways to reduce prices
without sacrificing our technological edge. This is not a minor




6 . Exercising the Submarine Force to its Fullest Potential
The submarine force of the future must consider a new
international security environment, a major change in overall
roles and missions for the armed forces, and a greatly con-
strained fiscal environment. It must also be designed in line
with the new emphasis on jointness. At the end of 1991, the JCS
published a new document, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces,
giving their view of the preferred conduct of future wars. It
is to the force of the future that this paper will now turn for
its conclusions.
6 . 1 Submarine Forces for Strategic Deterrence and Defense
The mission of day-to-day deterrence is gradually being
assumed more by the submarine force. The new U.S. Strategic
Command will involve Navy assets. Opportunities for joint duty by
submarine officers have been increased many times now that the
•
"? iNavy will make a major contribution to its staff.
The submarine force will have a continued important role to
play in the verification of arms control agreements and the
unilateral measures being taken in our great "disarmament race."
All too often, non-specialists eguate national technical means
(NTMs) of verification solely to unmanned overhead systems with-





The U.S. has not yet announced a basic shift in nuclear
targeting, but clearly such a shift must be contemplated. As we
reduce in overall warheads, our strategic nuclear forces will be
unable to "service" all the military, leadership, and other
targets associated with our "countervailing strategy" and we will
be forced to consider a shift to countervalue targeting. If the
U.S. shifts to countervalue, non-time-urgent targeting, there
will be no reason to retain a land-based or air-breathing nuclear
force—nuclear deterrence can and should be totally accomplished
by the sea-based force.
As we reduce the overall numbers of strategic nuclear war-
heads, and if we simultaneously place more emphasis on our sea-
based forces, there will be those that again raise the issue of
the few numbers of SSBNs being magnets for attack since the
payoff could be so high. In the new international security
environment, the burden of proof is on detractors who need to
demonstrate that an at-sea threat exists to the OHIO-class SSBN.
It surely does not exist today. We will need to monitor, howev-
er, the evolving technologies of foreign nations and take the
obvious prudent steps necessary to ensure that our deterrent
forces at sea remain invulnerable.
6.1.2 Defensive Forces
The President's restructuring of SDI into a mobile GPALS is




fiscal climate. Submarines carrying mobile theater or strategic
ballistic defenses are but one possibility for the future. Subma-
rines deployed well-forward offer the opportunity to catch a
ballistic missile in its relatively vulnerable boost phase where
an interception would net all warheads and not just one. Related
missions could include submarine-launched satellites as attrition
fillers or the use of submarines for anti-satellite attack.
Conventional military forces often are used to enhance the
performance or survival of nuclear forces. For example, the bulk
of the former Soviet Navy was expected, during a war, to deploy
in bastions where they would have defended SSBNs from attacks by
Western antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces--including attack
submarines. As the numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles are
reduced, due to arms control agreements, the importance of de-
fending and attacking conventional military forces will increase
since the value of each nuclear warhead target will be relatively
greater.
The dispersal of Russian SSBNs, and other nuclear offensive
forces, from known peacetime locations can be used by the Russian
government or Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) during a
crisis to send a message of political resolve. Dispersal areas
are often more easily accessible to ASW or SOF. With fewer nucle-
ar warheads expected in the Russian arsenal in the future, the
U.S. must consider strategic ASW more seriously than when each




One can make a strong case that strategic ASW as a declara-
tory programming mission should be dropped. The only real pro-
gramming threat that requires attacks against enemy SSBNs is the
REGT. A reconstitution strategy does not require the reinstate-
ment of 1980s warfighting forces--it calls for the rebuilding of
forces to deter a global war. There will be many options other
than forces required for strategic ASW. I make this recommenda-
tion in full recognition that despite our programmed threats and
programmed response, if a global war were to actually occur, our
submarine force would and should be tasked with the conduct of
strategic ASW.
There is also the possibility, albeit remote, that Russia
will forego deployment of SSBNs if its overall numbers of war-
heads drops to levels such as 1,000 or even 500. This is cer-
tainly not the recommendation coming from the Russian Navy nor
Ministry of Defense, but neither of these institutions will make
the decision to retain SSBNs or shift to a dyad or monad.
One should also consider how high in priority strategic ASW
is in the programming crisis/contingency scenarios developed
previously. The issue is one of priorities: do we approach the
problem from the perspective of what submarines are currently
optimized for, or do we deal with the threat, strategy, and
fiscal resources that we have been given. Professor Jim Wirtz




6 . 2 Submarine Forces for Forward Presence
Submarines have always performed significant, intelligence-
related, forward presence missions that have been of interest to
the national command authority (NCA) . Most of this mission has
been deliberately hidden from public view for reasons that were
sound but are now counterproductive. The forward presence intel-
ligence mission is one that must be sanitized for sensitivity and
declassified in order to justify numbers of units that are re-
quired on routine patrol.
Admiral Kelso's 1991 annual report talked in terms of four-
teen SSNs on forward deployment with a Base Force of 450 ships.
If the total numbers of ships or simply the total numbers of
submarines is reduced, it will be difficult to sustain such high
numbers on forward presence. We have seen suggestions for
Blue/Gold crews to help keep the deployed numbers high.
The obvious other alternative is a high/low mix. The French
Navy has maintained a forward presence for years in the South
Pacific and used low-capability units to accomplish this mission.
This option will need to be considered for the fleet, in full
recognition that these forces will have little or no combat
capability for crises or in war.
The issue here is the new, less robust, words that the
administration has associated with the phrase presence and wheth-
er the submarine force wishes to participate under those terras.




only a marginal military capability. The benefit is that the
numbers of units will be greater with a high/low mix.
The U.S. maintains a strategic nuclear deterrent and shore
bombardment presence in the world that is significant and often
overlooked. Are there opportunities to make the submarine force
more visible and will help reassure allies? Are there opportuni-
ties for standing regional naval forces, outside of NATO, in our
new regionally-focused defense strategy?
6. 3 Submarine Forces for Crisis Response
Crisis response, in an era of no significant opposition on
the high seas, means that the fleet can assume an essentially
unopposed transit to the area of conflict and shift its emphasis
to power projection ashore. The locus for naval warfare's battle
space has shifted to the littoral. This power projection will be
at the operational and tactical levels of warfare and set into
the context of a joint response--not the old "Navy/Marine Corps
Team." The submarine force must now become an integral part of
the "AirLand Battle" as well as battle group defense.
Forward-deployed submarines can arrive in a crisis area
rapidly and be positioned to launch unmanned surveillance systems
and deliver shore bombardment prior to the arrival of the Air
Force composite wing or the Navy CVBG. It is the best platform
for the rapid search and location of foreign submarines that must




group. Simply put, the submarine can accomplish the limited sea
superiority that will be required for LRCs or even initially in
an MRC.
The Air Force tells us that air superiority is needed prior
to other aviation missions being performed or a ground offensive/
counter-offensive being launched. Is that true at sea? Have we
studied the maritime operational-level of warfare sufficiently to
understand if the Navy's contributions can be made in the absence
of air superiority? What are the technological options that we
already have that have traditionally not been emphasized?
If enemy air defenses can be suppressed at the outset of a
campaign, as they were in DESERT STORM, then the numbers of
highly capable manned aircraft that are used for follow-on inter-
diction and strategic bombardment simply do not need to be as
high as in the past. There is a role for invulnerable submarine
platforms in the suppression of enemy air defenses.
The Navy should not attempt to compete with the Air Force
over the development of manned stealthy aircraft. It has the
opportunity to leapfrog deployed technologies and develop un-
manned systems that could place the submarine force at the cut-
ting edge of combat during a contingency response.
Submarines have been generally underrated for their contri-
bution to presence and crisis response. The submarine force will
need to fund the studies that will correct that perception.




officers should also obtain the historical short-term and long-
term political effect of the commitment of various types of armed
forces before they have the President asking "where are the
submarines?" instead of "where are the carriers?" The submarine
force must also explain the historical role that it has played in
successfully resolving past crises—not just responding to them.
Years ago, the Navy reclassified the names of some of our
traditional surface combatants in order to help justify the
force. Perhaps this is the time to reconsider the designation of
some attack submarines as strike submarines, patrol submarines,
or other terms that will break up the category into missions not
associated with ASW. If we want the President to ask "where are
the submarines?," then the submarine force should consider pro-
viding him with the name of a package of forces whose missions
clearly identify it as a part of our contingency response effort.
6 . 4 Submarine Forces for Reconstitution
Perhaps the most controversial aspect for the future subma-
rine force will be its role in reconstitution. With a lengthen-
ing of the warning time for a REGT to 8-10 years and the lack of
a high seas threat over the next decade that cannot be handled by
the improved LOS ANGELES class submarine, keeping the existing
industrial base intact will be extremely difficult. Industry and
the submarine force will need to present new alternatives for
keeping critical skills honed and our deployed technology ahead




The intelligence community will need enter into areas that
it has traditionally circumvented—economic intelligence. The
submarine community will need to cooperate with industry and
intelligence to monitor technologies and economic potential in
foreign nations that would indicate a desire to compete in de-
ployed undersea combat systems.
The whole subject of decision-making and reconstitution is
one that I have addressed elsewhere and does not bode well for
actual responses to an REGT. The armed forces should develop
contingency plans for an response to an REGT that does not in-
clude courageous decision-making by democratic governments and
the need to provide a rapid deterrent response. At-sea strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons are one such option. A reconstitut-
ed conventional force is another.
7 . Traditional Roles and Missions
This paper has largely been cast in terms that are new to
most submarine officers. That has been done by design. The old
Cold War logic of warfare has changed. We must now change the
grammar as well. The final paper of this session is by Captain
Arne Johnson. This paper is as fine a job as I have seen in
trying to bridge the gap between the new concepts of warfare and
the traditional roles and missions that you are familiar with.




The submarine force appears to be a key element in our
overall new national security strategy. It has a premiere role
in deterrence that most of us both understand and can foretell.
The submarine force also has major roles to play in presence and
crisis response. We will now examine those roles in detail.
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